University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Volume 2
1969

The Broad Role
Robert P. Griffin
United States Senate

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr
Part of the Judges Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert P. Griffin, The Broad Role, 2 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 285 (1969).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol2/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

THE BROAD ROLE

Robert P. Griffin*
The President, who exercises a limited power, may err without causing great mischief in
the State. Congress may decide amiss without destroying the Union, because the electoral body in which Congress originates may
cause it to retract its decision by changing its
members. But ifthe Supreme Court is ever
composed of imprudent men or bad citizens,
the Union may be plunged into anarchy or
civil war.
Alexis de Tocqueville
Democracy in America

The debate in the United States Senate over the nomination of Mr.
Justice Abe Fortas to the highest judicial post in our country culminated
in a motion of cloture on October 1, 1968. This motion was intended to
deny those opposed to Senate confirmation an opportunity to continue
discussion. The controversy surrounding the cloture motion and in a
broader sense surrounding the entire debate centers on one question:
what is the duty of the Senate to "advise and consent" to nominations
by the President for judges of the Supreme Court under the U.S. Constitution, article II, section 2? The Senate answered this question by
refusing to shut off debate and simply rubber-stamp the President's
nominee. Significantly, a majority of those voting, and those on record
but not voting, supported further debate.1 Therefore, the Senate
reaffirmed the broad and purposive obligation to scrutinize not only the
*United States Senator from Michigan. The source material for this article is drawn
primarily from Hearingson the Nomination ofAbe Fortas,of Tennessee, to be Chief
Justice of the United States, and the Nomination of Homer Thornberry, of Texas, to
be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. I & 2 (1968) and from several
speeches given by Sen. Griffin and reprinted in the Congressional Record: 114
CONG. AEC. E5977 (daily ed. June 28, 1968); Id. at S8504, (daily ed. July 11, 1968);
The Fortas- Thornberry Issue, an address to the National Press Club, Washington,
D.C., July 30, 1968, reprinted in 114 CONG. REC. S9848 (daily ed. July 31, 1968); Id.
at S10717 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1968); Id. at S11012 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1968); Id. at
S11337 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1968); Id. at S11684 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1968); Id. at
S 11856 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1968).
'The recorded vote was forty-five for cloture and forty-three against. Adding the recorded
preferences of Senators " voting, the outcome would be forty-seven for cloture and
forty-eight against, with five absent senators not indicating a preference. 114 CONG.
REC. S 11856 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1968).
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qualifications but also the quality of nominees to the high court: an
obligation which precedent and the very structure of our government
have entrusted to that chamber. The course of the actual debate, which
lasted only four days prior to the cloture vote, indicates that the proponents of this broad and purposive interpretation of the Senate's duty
pursued the central question honestly and diligently without the dilatory
irrelevancies of a "filibuster". The same concerns which I had expressed
at the time incumbent Chief Justice Earl Warren indicated his desire to
resign in June of 1968, were raised and weighed in the September
debate:
If an appropriate balance is to be maintained among the branches of our government, there are times in the course of history
when the United States Senate must draw a
line and stand up.
I am convinced that this is such a time.
Positions on the Supreme Court of the
United States cannot be regarded as ordinary
political plums. Such deviations as may have
been condoned in the past cannot serve as a
guide for the present or the future.
The importance of the Supreme Court as
an institution cannot be over-emphasized. Its
decisions reach out and touch the lives of
every American every day.
It was the intention of our founding fathers
that an appointment to the Supreme Court
should represent the pinnacle of achievement
and recognition in the field of law.
At the very least, nominations to the Supreme Court should never be based on cronyism. If and when they are, the Senate's responsibility is clear.
I reject the view that the Senate should
rubber-stamp its approval of every Presidential appointment simply because a nominee
doesn't beat his wife. The responsibility of
the Senate must be of a higher order, particularly with respect to the Supreme Court of
the United States.
At the present time, the American people
are in the process of choosing a new government. By their votes in November the people
will designate new leadership and new direction for our nation.
Of course, a "lame duck" President has the
Constitutional power to submit nominations
for the Supreme Court. But the Senate need
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not confirm them-and, in this case, should
not do so.
The maneuvering to deny the people and
the next President their choice in this instance is wrong in principle -and everybody
knows it.
The appointments announced yesterday
smack of "cronyism" at its worst-and everybody knows it.
Although other elements came into consideration as further evidence
was brought out in the hearings of the Senate Judiciary Committee, that
summary indicates the basic reason for opposing the nomination of Abe Fortas. This article will expand on two major points: first,
the nature of the higher responsibility which the Senate owes to considerations of judicial nominations; and second, the factors generally
influencing non-consent in the Fortas case. The purpose is not to reopen
a discussion of the particularities of Justice Abe Fortas' quality for
appointment as Chief Justice of the United States. Rather we will be
concerned only with the types of factors influencing a Senate determination.

The Historical Context for Advice and Consent
Much of the controversy revolves around the appropriate functions of
the President and of the Senate in the circumstances of a nomination to
the Supreme Court. There are some who suggest that the Senate's role is
limited merely to ascertaining whether a nominee is "qualified" in the
sense that he possesses some minimum measure of academic background or experience. It should be emphasized at the outset that any
such view of the Senate's function with respect to nominations for the
separate judicial branch of the government is wrong and simply does not
square with the precedents or with the intention of those who conferred
the "advice and consent" power upon the Senate.
I am firmly convinced that approval by the confirming authority of a
nomination to the third highest post in our land, the highest judicial post,
on the basis of the record before the Senate in the Fortas case, would
have been a disservice to the nation and would have constituted an
abdication of the "advice and consent" power of the Senate. To assure
the independence of the judiciary as a separate and coordinate branch,
then, it is important to recognize that this power of the Senate with
respect to the judiciary is not only real, but it is at least as important as
the power of the President to nominate.
No one denies the constitutional power of the President to make an
appointment to the Supreme Court, technically even at a time when he is
only a few months from leaving office. But, of course, that is not the
point. Some have not understood, or will not recognize, that under our
Constitution the power of any President to nominate constitutes only
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one-half of the appointing process. The other half of the appointing
process lies within the jurisdiction of the Senate, which has not only the
constitutional power but the solemn obligation to determine whether to
confirm such a nomination. Because the Senate has not used its power of
"advice and consent," there is a widespread belief that it is almost a
rubber-stamp.
However, against the backdrop of history we must recognize that the
Senate has not only the right but the responsibility to consider more than
the mere qualifications of a nominee to the Supreme Court of the United
States, the highest tribunal in a separate, independent and coordinate
branch of the government. The Senate has a duty to look beyond the
question: "Is he qualified?" The Senate must not be satisfied with
anything less than application of the highest standards, not only as to
professional competence but also as to such necessary qualities of character as a sense of restraint and propriety. A distinguished former
colleague, Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, put it this way:
The "advice and consent" of the Senate
required by the Constitution for such appointments (to the Judiciary) was intended to
be real, and not nominal. A large proportion
of the members of the (Constitutional) Convention were fearful that if judges owed their
appointments solely to the President the
Judiciary, even with life tenure, would then
become dependent upon the executive and
the powers of the latter would become overweening. By requiring joint action of the legislature and the executive, it is believed that
the Judiciary would be made more independent.
Illuminating the appropriateness of these views is the clear history of
the formulation of constitutional obligations built into the structure of
our government to realize such objectives as an independent judiciary
and checks and balances on respective centers of power. In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton wrote that the requirement of Senate
approval in the appointing process would
... be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism of the President, and would tend
greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit
characters from state prejudice, from family
connection, from personal attachments, or
from a view to popularity.
In the Constitutional Convention of 1787, James Madison generally
favored the creation of a strong executive; he advocated giving the
President an absolute power of appointment within the executive branch
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of the government. Madison stood with Alexander Hamilton against
Benjamin Franklin and others who were concerned about granting the
President such power on the ground that it might tend toward a
monarchy. While he argued for the power of the President to appoint
within the executive branch, it is very important to note that Madison
drew a sharp distinction with respect to appointments to the Supreme
Court, the judicial branch. Madison did not believe that judges should be
appointed by the President; he was inclined to give this power to "a
senatorial branch as numerous enough to be confided in-and not so
numerous as to be governed by the motives of the other branch; as being
sufficiently stable and independent to follow clear, deliberate judgments."
At one point during the convention, after considerable debate and
delay, the Committee on Detail reported a draft which provided for the
appointment of judges of the Supreme Court by the Senate. Gouverneur
Morris and others would not agree, and the matter was put aside. It was
not finally resolved until the next to last day of the Constitutional
Convention. The compromise language agreed upon provides that the
President "shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, shall appoint judges of the Supreme Court and all other
officers of the United States." Clearly, the compromise language neither
confers upon the President an unlimited power to appoint within the
executive branch nor confers upon the Senate a similar power of appointment with respect to the judiciary. Significantly, however, we have
moved in actual practice over the years toward those original objectives
of Madison. It is a fact, though sometimes deplored by political scientists, that judges of the lower federal courts are actually "nominated" by
Senators while the President exercises nothing more than a veto authority. On the other hand, the Senate has generally accorded the widest
latitude to the President in the selection of the members of his cabinet.
It is recognized that unless he is given a free hand in the choice of these
associates, he cannot be held accountable for the administration of the
executive branch of government.
I believe that history demonstrates that the Senate has generally
viewed the appointment of a cabinet official in a different light than an
appointment of a Supreme Court Justice. The general attitude of the
Senate over the years with respect to cabinet nominations was expressed by Senator Guy Gillette of Iowa in these words:
One of the last men on earth I would want in
my cabinet is Harry Hopkins. However, the
President wants him. He is entitled to
him ... I shall vote for the confirmation of
Harry Hopkins....
Throughout our history, only eight out of 564 cabinet nominations have
failed to win Senate confirmation.
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The reasons for a limited Senate role with respect to executive branch
appointments, however, do not apply when the nomination is for a
lifetime position on the Supreme Court, the highest tribunal in the
independent, third branch of government. 2 No less a spokesman than
former Justice Felix Frankfurter has emphasized one of the chief reasons for the higher responsibility of the Senate to look beyond mere
qualifications in the case of a Supreme Court nominee:
The meaning of 'due process' and the content of terms like 'liberty' are not revealed by
the Constitution. It is the Justices who make
the meaning. They read into the neutral language of the Constitution their own economic
and social views... Let us face the fact that
five justices of the Supreme Court are the
molders of policy rather than the impersonal
vehicles of revealed truth.
In an oft-quoted statement Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes noted
wryly: "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the
judges say it is."
Thus, when the Senate considers a nomination to one of the nine
lifetime positions on the Supreme Court of the United States, particularly a nomination to the position of Chief Justice, the importance of its
2

In this context, it is interesting to take note of the Senate's approach toward nominations
for regulatory boards and commissions-agencies which are "neither fish nor fowl" in
the scheme of government and perform quasi-executive functions and quasi-judicial
functions. For example, in 1949, President Truman nominated Leland Olds for a
third term as a member of the Federal Power Commission. Since Olds had served on
the Commission for ten years, it was difficult to argue that he lacked qualifications.
The Senate finally voted to reject the nomination. Afterward, there was general
comment in the press that the real issue had nothing to do with the nominee's
qualifications but everything to do with regulation of the price of natural gas.
In considering such nominations, it has not been unusual for the Senate to focus on
the charge of "cronyism." That was the issue in 1946 when President Truman
nominated a close personal friend, George Allen, not to a lifetime position on the
Supreme Court, but to be a member of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Not
only did such columnists as David Lawrence react sharply, but the New York Times
opposed the nomination as well. Senator Taft led the opposition declaring that Allen
was one of three who were nominated "only because they are personal friends of the
President. Such appointments as these are a public affront."
In 1949, the Washington Post severely criticized the nomination by President
Truman of Mon C. Wallgren, not to a lifetime position on the Supreme Court, but to
be a member of the National Security Resources Board. A former Governor and
Senator, the nominee had become a close friend of President Truman when the two
served together on the Truman committee. The Washington Post characterized this
nomination as a "revival of government by crony which we thought went out of
fashion with Warren G. Harding." The Senate Committee which considered Wallgren's nomination voted seven to six against confirmation and the matter never
reached the Senate floor.
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determination cannot be compared in any sense to the consideration of a
bill for enactment into law. If Congress makes a mistake in the enactment of legislation, it can always return at a later date to correct the
error. But once the Senate gives its "advice and consent" to a lifetime
appointment to the Supreme Court, there is no such convenient way to
correct an error since the nominee is not answerable thereafter to either
the Senate or to the American people.
Throughout our history as a nation, until the pending nominations
were submitted, one hundred and twenty-five persons have been nominated as Justices of the Supreme Court. Of that number, twenty-one, or
one-sixth, failed to receive confirmation by the Senate. The question of
qualifications or fitness was an issue on only four of these twenty-one
occasions. In debating nominations for the Supreme Court, the Senate
has never hesitated to take into account a nominee's political views,
philosophy, writings, and attitude on particular issues.
The Senate's responsibility to weigh these factors is not diminished by
the fact that such professional organizations as the American Bar Association limit their own inquiries. The ABA committee on the federal
judiciary has acknowledged limitations on its role. For example, letters
from the chairman of the committee, Albert E. Jenner, to Senator James
Eastland which transmitted the committee's recommendation with respect to the nominations of Abe Fortas and Homer Thornberry contained this statement:
... [O]ur responsibility [is] to express our
opinion only on the question of professional
qualification, which includes, of course, consideration of age and health, and of such matters as temperament, integrity, trial and other
experience, education and demonstrated legal
ability. It is our practice to express no opinion at any time with regard to any other consideration not related to such professional
qualifications which may properly be considered by the appointing or confirming authority. [Emphasis added].

Factors Affecting Quality in a Nomination
and a Nominee
Only the broader and more purposive interpretation of the Senate's
duty to "advise and consent" to judicial nominations to the highest court
can insure that the quality of those nine influential public servants will
remain worthy of the reputation established in the past. Even before the
current controversy erupted, public confidence in the Supreme Court,
regretfully, had fallen to an all-time low. The Gallup poll survey in June
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1968 reported before this controversy arose that sixty per cent of the
American people did not have a favorable opinion of the Supreme
Court. Undoubtedly, much of this disfavor can be attributed to widespread dissatisfaction with some of the more controversial rulings of the
Court in various fields, but the prestige of the Supreme Court does not
hinge solely on the results it may reach in particular cases. There are
other even more compelling influences; the same Gallup poll, for example, reported that sixty-one per cent of the people favored a change in
the method of selecting Supreme Court Justices. This strongly suggests
that the circumstances which surround the appointment of a Justice
profoundly affect the capacity of the Court to merit public confidence.
Therefore, a part of the Senate's responsibility must be to guarantee that
under the present method of selection these circumstances are unimpeachably correct.
At the beginning of this crusade before Mr. Fortas and Mr. Thornberry were even named, I made it clear that I would vote against
confirmation of any nominee by President Johnson to be Chief Justice-whether he named a Republican or Democrat, a liberal, conservative or a moderate. The circumstances surrounding the resignation
of the incumbent indicated, first, that the outgoing President should not
attempt to fill the vacancy and, second, that a "retractable retirement"
was being used to pressure the Senate into accepting a particular nominee. I took the position that, in view of these circumstances, public
confidence in the Court could be strengthened if the next Chief Justice
were named to fill a real vacancy by the new President after the people
had an opportunity to vote in November.
With regard to the retractable resignation, The New Republic magazine commented:
Executive officers serve under the direction
and at the pleasure of the President. It is
unobjectionable, and right, that they should
make their resignations effective at his pleasure... But judicial officers are independent
of the President...
It is perhaps a small, symbolic point only,
but the symbols of judicial independence are
not trivial; they are an important source of
judicial power and effectiveness.
The point, moreover, goes beyond the symbolic, as Chief Justice Warren himself ingeniously emphasized at his press conference
on July 5. He was still in office, said the Chief
Justice, and would return to preside in the fall
if the Senate fails to confirm Abe Fortas, of
whom he thinks well.
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That may not have been intended as a form
of pressure, but it looked like it. The pressure
was, in any event, implicit in the manner of
Chief Justice Warren's retirement
... Retirements which are effective on a date
which is certain and irrevocable ensure that a
replacement will be considered on his own
merits, and not as a choice between himself
and his predecessor.
The practice of retiring or resigning, as
Chief Justice Warren did, effective upon the
qualification of a successor, is unprecedented
in the Supreme Court. It seems to have
grown up among lower federal judges. It has
nothing to commend it.

Apart from this unfortunate pressure tactic, the "vacancy" so created
was to be filled by an outgoing President. The nation in 1968 was
seething with unrest and calling for change. A new generation demanded
to be heard and given a voice in charting the future of America. Particularly at such a point in our history the Senate would have been most
unwise to put its stamp of approval on a cynical effort to thwart the
orderly processes of change.
In addition to this responsibility to guarantee quality in the circumstances of nomination, the Senate must evaluate the quality of the
nominee himself. Since the duty to "advise and consent" requires more
than a cursory glance at the nominee's credentials, various factors may
legitimately concern the Senate. I do not intend to evaluate once again
the merits of the controversy surrounding the nomination of Mr. Justice
Fortas. However, I will use the facts of that situation to illustrate some
of the factors that indicate quality or lack of it in a presidential nomination to the Supreme Court.
To be quite candid, I suspect that I might have been a lonely figure
standing in the Senate opposing any nominees solely on the ground that
they were appointed under "lame-duck" circumstances. In submitting
the particular nominations that he did, however, President Johnson
provided in a most accommodating way several additional reasons to
oppose his candidates.
Mr. Fortas and Mr. Thornberry were selected primarily because they
were close and long standing personal friends of President Johnson, not
because they were among the best qualified in the nation to fill the
particular positions. The charge of "cronyism" is not new to Senate
confirmation debates, but it is highly unusual for any President to subject himself to that charge with respect to a nomination for the Supreme
Court of the United States. Never before in history has any President
been so bold as to subject himself to the charge of "cronyism" with
respect to two Supreme Court nominations at the same time.
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Some have said that if a person, even though nominated because he is
a "crony", is still "qualified", he should be approved. I reject this view
because it diminishes public respect for the Supreme Court. In 1968
there was clearly manifested a desperate need to restore respect for law
and order, as well as respect for the institutions which bear responsibility for maintaining law and order. This need was not met by nominations to the highest court which could be legitimately branded as
"cronyism".
Similarly the public must be expected to respond with the utmost
skepticism to the acceptance by a Supreme Court Justice of a fee for
seminar teaching which exceeded by a ratio of nearly seven to one the
usual compensation for such a course and which, more importantly, was
privately raised by a former law partner from businessmen previously
unconnected with the university through which the fee was paid. Such
an action is clearly wrong in principle and violates the canons of judicial
ethics. While it may not violate any law, the Senate has the responsibility nevertheless to weigh such conduct in measuring the sense of
discrimination, propriety and judgment of a nominee.
Notwithstanding the grave concern raised by the propriety of the
"Seminar fund", I believe the factor that gave rise to the most disagreement in the Fortas case concerned the Justice's extrajudicial involvement. I am confident that the public did not approve of the admitted telephone call made by Mr. Justice Fortas to a business friend,
criticizing a public statement that Vietnam war costs would run $5
billion higher than Administration estimates. I am also confident that the
public did not condone the fact that Mr. Justice Fortas admittedly
participated in the decision-making process of the executive branch of
government on such matters as the Vietnam war and the Detroit riots.
However, perhaps most disturbing was the fact that the nominee
stated to the Senate Judiciary Committee that he was proud of his
extrajudicial activities and that he "did not see anything wrong" with
them. When it became apparent that the Senate was far more deeply
concerned with these extrajudicial activities than he himself was, the
nominee declined to appear on a second occasion before the Judiciary
Committee. I have never questioned the right of Mr. Justice Fortas to
refuse to answer questions concerning decisions in which he has participated. 3 My concern goes to his refusal to answer questions concerning
3There is serious question whether the nominee preserved his right, however. Senator
Ervin of North Carolina questioned Mr. Fortas on many of his decisions, and Mr.
Fortas refused to answer those questions. The nominee was quite consistent in that
decision until he recalled a case that was in his favor, and suddenly he felt free to
discuss a decision in which he had participated:
For example -may I mention one, I wonder, without
breaching my constitutional responsibility as I see
it-just one. For example, I think that one of the most
important decisions that we made in my three years on

April 1969]

The Fortas Controversy

his participation in extrajudicial matters as to which he could not possibly assert immunity under the doctrine of the separation of powers. As
he came to the committee at one time to discuss these subjects voluntarily, he was simply without justification in refusing to answer further
4
questions in this regard.

Scrutinizing One Factor: Involvement
with the Executive
Each of these aspects in the record before the Senate generated
serious questions as to the quality of the nominee, if not as to his
qualifications. Perhaps the most crucial aspect deserves an extended
examination: the involvement of a justice in the executive branch of the
government.
The doctrine of separation of powers is the most fundamental concept
embodied in our Constitution, and yet separation of powers was not
the Court in the field of criminal law is a case that has
received no attention, a case called Warden v. Hayden
[387 U.S. 294 (1967)]. In that case we did overrule a
precedent. We overruled the case of Gouled v. United
States [255 U.S. 298] decided in 1921 by a unanimous
Court. Holmes and Brandeis were on that court .... See
Hearings, supra note *,pt I at 170.
It might be argued that at that point the nominee waived his immunity from discussing other decisions of the Court as well.
4 In addition two officials of the Johnson administration refused to appear and give
testimony before the Committee on Judiciary concerning reports that Justice Abe
Fortas had helped the White House in drafting legislation in 1968. In letters to the
committee, Treasury Undersecretary Joseph W. Barr and W. DeVier Pierson, associate special counsel to the President, based their refusal on the claim of "executive
privilege."
Yet in a letter dated March 7, 1962, to Chairman John Moss of the Special
Government Information Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government
Operations, President John F. Kennedy wrote:
As you know, this Administration has gone to great
lengths to achieve full cooperation with the Congress in
making available to it all appropriate documents, correspondence and information. This is the basic policy of
this Administration, and it will continue to be so. Executive privilege can be invoked only by the President and
will not be used without specific Presidentialapproval.
[Emphasis added].
Further, in a letter of April 2, 1965, to Representative Moss, President Johnson
wrote:
Since assuming the Presidency, I have followed the
policy laid down by President Kennedy in his letter to
you of March 7, 1962, dealing with the subject. Thus, the
claim of "executive privilege" will continue to be made
only by the President.[Emphasisadded].
To my knowledge, the refusal by Messrs. Barr and Pierson was the first outright
violation of that sound policy.
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even a unique invention of the delegates assembled at Philadelphia in
1787. Even before the Constitutional Convention, every state constitution drafted or revised during the Revolutionary period embodied
the doctrine of separation of powers as the very starting point, creating
in each instance separate and distinct executive, judicial, and legislative
branches. As James Madison told the convention, separation of powers
is "a fundamental principle of free government." Only when power is
divided under a system of checks and balances can we expect to find
government limited, responsible, and free. But if the doctrine of separate
powers is important, what constitutional justification is there for a member of the judicial branch while serving on the bench to participate
actively in decisions of the executive branch on a regular, undisclosed
basis?
The answer has been clear since 1793, when Secretary of State
Thomas Jefferson, acting on behalf of President George Washington,
sought the advice of the Justices of the Supreme Court on twenty-nine
controversial matters. Jefferson asked the Justices "whether the public
may, with propriety, be availed of their advice on these questions." The
Supreme Court firmly declined to give its opinion to the executive
branch, saying in part:
We have considered the previous question
stated... regarding the lines of separation,
drawn by the Constitution between the three
departments of government. These being in
certain respects checks upon each other, and
our being Judges of a Court in the last resort,
are considerations which afford strong arguments against the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions alluded
to, especially as the power given by the Constitution to the President, of calling on the
heads of departments for opinions, seems to
have been purposely as well as expressly
united in the Executive departments. [Emphasis added].
This same principle has been reinforced through time. In 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called upon Chief Justice Stone for assistance in arriving at executive decisions in connection with wartime
rubber problems. In response to the President's request Chief Justice
Stone replied as follows:
I have your letter of the 17th .... Personal
and patriotic considerations alike afford powerful incentives for my wish to comply with
your request that I assist you in arriving at
some solution of the pending rubber problem.
But most anxious, not to say painful,

April 1969)

The Fortas Controversy

reflection has led me to the conclusion that I
cannot rightly yield to my desire to render for
you a service which as a private citizen I
should not only feel bound to do but one
which I should undertake with zeal and enthusiasm...
A judge, and especially the Chief Justice,
cannot engage in political debate or make
public defense of his acts. When his action is
judicial he may always rely upon the support
of the defined record upon which his action is
based and of the opinion in which he and his
associates unite as stating the ground of decision. But when he participates in the action of
the executive or legislative departments of
government he is without those supports. He
exposes himself to attack and indeed invites
it, which because of his peculiar situation inevitably impairs his value as a judge and the
appropriate influence of his office.
I do not suggest that a Justice of the Supreme Court-should have no
contact whatever with the President or with members of the legislative
branch while he sits on the bench. However, the people have a right to
expect that such contacts will not breach the constitutional line which
necessarily separates the branches of our government and that such
contacts will be characterized by the restraints customarily observed by
members of the judiciary.
In his testimony, Mr. Justice Fortas acknowledged that he had participated in White House deliberations concerning the policy of the executive branch with respect to Vietnam and the Detroit riots while sitting
on the Supreme Court. In seeking to explain this to the committee, Mr.
Fortas said:
... I have, on occasion, been asked to come
to the White House to participate in conferences on critical matters having nothing
whatever to do with any legal situation or
with anything before the Court or that might
come before the Court.
At another point the nominee assured the Judiciary Committee:
There was nothing involved in the conferences, the consultations, or the issues that
were discussed in which the Court might possibly become involved.
Acceptance of such assurances would certainly have been misplaced,
for it is evident that cases have already reached the Court pertaining to
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executive matters in which Mr. Fortas participated while sitting as a
Justice of the Supreme Court. In United States v. O'Brien,5 a case
arising out of the burning of a draft card in protest to the Vietnam war,
Justice Douglas stated in dissent:
The Court states that the constitutional
power of Congress to raise and support armies is "broad and sweeping" and that Congress' power "to classify and conscript manpower for military service is 'beyond question."' This is undoubtedly true in times
when, by declaration of Congress, the Nation
is in a state of war. The underlying and basic
problem in this case, however, is whether
conscription is permissible in the absence of a
declaration of war. That question has not
been briefed nor was it presented in oral argument; but it is, I submit, a question upon
which the litigants and the country are entitled to a ruling ....
This case should be put
down for reargument and heard with Holmes
v. United States and with Hart v. United
States, post, p. 956, in which the Court today
denies certiorari.
The rule that this Court will not consider
issues not raised by the parties is not
inflexible and yields in "exceptional cases"
(Duignan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195,
200) to the need correctly to decide the case
before the court. E.g., Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64; Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1.
In such a case it is not unusual to ask for
reargument (Sherman v. United States, 356
U.S. 369, 379, n. 2, Frankfurter, J. concurring) even on a constitutional question not
raised by the parties .... [case citations and
discussion omitted] ...
These precedents demonstrate the appropriateness of restoring the instant case to the
calendar for reargument on the question of
the constitutionality of a peacetime draft and
having it heard with Holmes
v. United States
and Hart v. United States.6

5 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
6391

U.S. at 389-91.
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Thus, although the issue was not directly presented, Justice Douglas
dissented from the Court's opinion and raised the question whether the
Supreme Court should hear argument on the constitutionality of the
draft absent a declaration of war by Congress in the Vietnam war. The
issue was, therefore, before the Court because the Justices had to decide
whether to hear argument which they ultimately decided not to invite.
In Holmes v. United States7 and Hart v. United States,8 Justice
Stewart as well as Justice Douglas indicated that the Court should
consider questions concerning the war in Vietnam. In Holmes Justice Stewart stated in a memorandum:

This case, like Hart v. United States, No.
1044, Misc., post, p. 956, involves the power
of Congress, when no war has been declared,
to enact a law providing for a limited period
of compulsory military training and service,
with an alternative of compulsory domestic
civilian service under certain circumstances.
It does not involve the power, in the absence
of a declaration of war, to compel military
service in armed international conflict overseas. If the latter question were presented, I
would join Mr. Justice Douglas in voting to
grant the writ of certiorari. 9
Although his opinion was somewhat more limited than that of Justice
Douglas, Justice Stewart in these cases also believed that the questions
pertaining to the validity of the war in Vietnam should have been heard
by the Court. Justice Fortas did not disqualify himself, but rather, asfar as the record shows, he participated on the Court in these three
decisions. Moreover, it would not sufficiently protect the public interest
for a Justice who had engaged in executive consultations merely to
disqualify himself from judicial consideration of any resulting litigation.
If one or two Justices were allowed to participate in executive decisions
on such a basis, then surely all nine Justices could do so and then there
would be no Court to decide the controversy. Even if this ultimate
breakdown were not likely to occur frequently, the number of Justices
available in each case would probably be reduced, thus decreasing the
interaction of human minds which was envisioned by those who set the
number by law.
In response to questions concerning his participation in the actual
drafting of legislation within the executive branch, the nominee responded at one point very flatly: "It is not true that I have ever helped to
7 391 U.S. 936 (1968).

8391 U.S. 956 (1968).
9 391 U.S. at 936.
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frame a measure since I have been a Justice of the Court." Yet less than
two months earlier Justice Fortas was involved in the preparation of an
amendment to the Treasury Department's appropriation bill, pertaining
to the security and protection of presidential candidates. The testimony
of Senator Gordon Allott of Colorado on May 27, 1968, revealed that
Under Secretary of the Treasury Joseph Barr had informed him in
substantially the following terms:
...[T]his is the amendment [referring to the
Secret Service protection amendment] they
want at the White House. It has been gone
over by De Vier Pierson and Abe Fortas,
and they have cleared it and they can live
with it.
Obviously, Senator Allott's testimony raised serious question concerning the weight which could have been accorded by the Senate to Mr.
Fortas' earlier testimony. As has already been pointed out, even more
disturbing than this apparent contradiction was the refusal by Mr. Fortas
after this discrepancy came to light to return to the committee in order
to clear it up.
After acknowledging participation in White House conferences concerning the Vietnam war and the Detroit riots, Mr. Fortas testified, "I
guess I have made full disclosure now." Senator Allot's testimony is a
direct challenge to that statement: a challenge which stands uncontradicted, saying to the Senate and to the nation that the nominee did not
make a full disclosure of his activities in the executive branch while
serving as a Justice of the Supreme Court.
Mr. Fortas admitted under questioning that he had called a friend,
Ralph Lazarus, to criticize a statement made on behalf of the business
council of Hot Springs, Virginia, concerning the cost of the Vietnam
war. It had been reported in the June 4, 1967, issue of the New York
Times that Justice Fortas had made this call to transmit President
Johnson's ire to the business council over the statement. However,
when he was questioned further concerning a report in the New York
Times of July 18, 1968, that business executives at the meeting said that
Lazarus reported that Fortas told him that the President was upset,
Justice Fortas replied: "Senator, I could not say in one say or the other
about that. Ijust do not remember."
Thus, whether we look to the testimony of Senator Allott, or to the
testimony of the nominee himself, or to the other uncontradicted reports,
one cannot avoid the conclusion that serious doubts existed as to whether Mr. Fortas did in fact make a full disclosure of his activities in the
executive branch. Both the questions which were left unanswered and
the responses that were in fact made suggested less than the minimum
level of propriety and discretion necessary in relation to the problem of
involvement with the executive branch.
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It is well to remember that the problem does involve propriety and
discretion because existing law does not provide adequate rules of conduct for involvement of a judge in executive affairs. On the contrary, the
propriety of taking men from the bench to fill executive posts is governed almost wholly by judicial ethics and public policy. 10 The practice
of a federal judge acting in some other governmental capacity without
resigning his office is restricted statutorily only by the Dual Compensation Act of 196411 which repealed and updated the prior Act of
July 31, 1894.12 The Act of 1894, when in effect, had been narrowly
circumscribed by rulings such as those which construed "office" to
apply only to "constitutional" offices, creating a broad field of
non-judicial posts where a judge could serve unhampered by legal restrictions. Neither the Act of 1894 nor the present law applies to the
situation where the non-judicial post carries no compensation.
When the practice of using federal judges beyond the judiciary arose
in the early period of our country's history, men like Jefferson, Madison
and Pinckney were opposed because it tended to make the bench an
"annex" of a political party and an "auxiliary" to the executive branch.
In the words of the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1947:
Where the practice is infrequent, it may
well be reasoned that the situation will take
care of itself; but where there is an increasing
tendency to draft members of the judiciary
for executive and nonjudicial duties, as is the
case in modern times, the propriety of the
practice should be examined anew if the integrity of the judiciary in American life is to
be preserved.
What may happen to judges in the exercise
of their judicial functions if the tendency increases to appoint them to Executive offices?
Will it not be difficult for them to maintain the
integrity and independence of the judicial
office if the practice becomes common of selecting them for executive positions carrying
exceptional privileges and prestige? Would
not the suspicion be ever present that the
President might gain desired ends by favoring
judges in Executive appointments? Ill motives need not be charged at all; they will be

10Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Independence of Judges: Should
They be used for Nonjudicial Work?, reprinted in 33 A.B.A.J. 792 (1947).
11Dual Compensation Act §301, 5 U.S.C. §5533 (1964).
12 5 U.S.C. §62.
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present as a matter of course where the situation, by its very nature, carries the seeds of
suspicion.
With respect to the acknowledged fact that a judge may not be compelled to perform non-judicial duties, the Senate Judiciary Committee
has warned of other pressures which may become equally coercive:
Elements other than statutory are present.
Public opinion is a compelling factor. It is
difficult for a judge to refuse the Executive
when the request is placed on the plane of
patriotism in time of war. Even without the
compelling argument of war a judge is embarrassed in refusing an appointment when urged
to serve on the grounds of indispensability,
even though the doctrine of the indispensable
man has no real place in American public life.
Personal motives may easily join with the
urgent call to duty in exerting strong pressure
on the judge to accept nonjudicial appointments. Ambition is a wholesome human trait
and judges are human. If it becomes common
to expect Executive appointments, judges
may slip into that frame of mind which seeks
promotional opportunity at the hand of the
Executive and the quality of the judicial character may be impaired. This could take on an
ugly political tinge if judges came to see in
the Executive appointment a chance to advance themselves politically or a chance to
aid the Chief Executive politically.
The American Bar Association's Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances has ruled on whether a judge might also properly hold
an office in another branch of the government. The committee concluded
that this was clearly improper, since it "might easily involve conflicting
obligations." The Canons of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Association themselves admonish against this practice. Canon 24 precludes
acceptance of "inconsistent duties". Canon 34 insists that the judge's
"conduct should be above reproach". Canon 31 precludes the judge's
practice of law, though it allows acting as an arbitrator, author, lecturer
or instructor of law and accepting compensation provided "such course
does not interfere with the due performance of his judicial duties." The
same conclusions were summed up in the 1947 Senate Judiciary Committee report:
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A judge who embarks upon official nonjudicial activities in another branch of the Government lays himself open to the charge that
he is undertaking "conflicting obligations" or
"inconsistent duties", that in spirit he is violating the doctrine of the separation of powers, and that in discharging his nonjudicial
duties he is neglecting the proper performance of the judicial ones. [Footnotes
omitted].
Since statutory law is inadequate to govern such a practice and control the dangers inherent in it, a heavy burden of discretion must rest
with the President who would suggest non-judicial missions. the
obligation of the Senate is equally important, for it can contribute a
means of control through close scrutiny of the propriety of judicial
nominees who have during their term participated in executive affairs.
The conclusion of the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1947 was clear:
The Committee on the Judiciary of the
United States Senate declares that the practice of using Federal judges for nonjudicial
activities is undesirable. The practice holds
great danger of working a diminution of the
prestige of the judiciary. It is a determent to
the proper functioning of the judicial branch
of the Government.
This same conclusion governed the determination of the Senate with
respect not only to the non-judicial activities of Justice Fortas in the
executive branch, but also with respect to the other factors which
detracted from the level of quality in that nomination. I am convinced
that due to the Senate vote on October 1, 1968, rejecting cloture of
debate on the presidential nomination of Abe Fortas, future Presidents
will take more care in submitting nominations, particularly those for the
Supreme Court. I believe there will be hope again that judges approaching the stature of Learned Hand or Benjamin Cardozo will be appointed
to the Supreme Court: not for personal or political reward, but simply
because they are among the best qualified in the land. If this hope is
realized, there will be a sounder foundation upon which to build confidence and to restore public respect for the Supreme Court as an
institution.

